Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is infrastructure less, dynamic, decentralized network of wireless mobile nodes. Although MANET is very much useful but it suffers from different security issues. Dropping packets by selfish nodes is one of them. Presence of selfish nodes in MANET may damage the entire communication system. So, it is highly required to detect those selfish nodes and promote cooperation in MANET. Here, a new game theoretic scheme has been proposed for selfish node detection in MANET.
Introduction
MANET can be defined as a network that has large number of autonomous or free nodes. It is autonomous, decentralized, flexible and supports multi hop routing. Besides numerous advantages, MANET has some vulnerabilities, such as lack of centralized authority, limited bandwidth, limited power supply, limited availability of resource, dynamic topology, routing overhead etc. MANET is based on the assumption that each node is co-operative and trusted. But in reality, some of the nodes may act selfishly. These selfish nodes use the network and receive services from other nodes but they do not cooperate with other nodes of the network. The establishment of multi-hop routes in an ad hoc network relies on the fact that every node will forward packets for one another. However, a selfish node, in order to conserve its limited energy resources, could decide not to behave cooperatively. If every node of the network decides to act selfishly, then the entire network could be collapsed.
Game theory tries to focus at the relationship between the participants in a particular game model and then predicts their optimal decisions. It can be used to find out how the performance of MANET may be affected by the selfish nature of nodes. A game is made up of three components: a set of players, a set of strategies or actions and utility function or payoffs. In MANET, the players are the nodes of the network. The actions are the different alternatives available to each player. When each player chooses an action, the resulting action profile determines the outcome of the entire game. Using game model, steady-state conditions known as Nash equilibrium can be identified.
Effect of Selfish node in MANET can be described using Payoff matrix 1 . In Payoff matrix, a Nash equilibrium can be defined as a set of strategies, one strategy for each player, such that no player of the game has incentive to alter its strategy given what other players of the game are doing. An outcome of a game is said to be Pareto optimal if no other outcome of the game provides every player of the game at least same benefit while providing at least anyone player better payoff. To illustrate this, a network of three users can be considered. Each user either shares its files with other users or not. So, strategy set of each player becomes Share, Not share. Here, it is assumed that each player will be benefitted by 2 units for every other user which shares files and a player expends 3 units for sharing its own. So, the payoff matrix becomes as shown in Fig. 1 .
From the payoffs it is observed that the best choice for each player is to not share. The unique Nash Equilibrium is not share for each user i.e. (Not share, Not share, Not share). In this case the Nash Equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Only when each player shares i.e. (Share, Share, Share), will make all three players payoffs better than the Nash Equilibrium action tuple. Here, we can see that if any player behaves selfishly and denies to share then it will affect the total system. All the nodes will be benefitted if and only if they are cooperative in nature.
Related Works
In the work of Feng, Zhu and Luo 2 , a game theory based cooperative incentive mechanism has been proposed. The utility function includes three parameters -dependence, cooperation capability, reputation. The objective of the cooperative incentive mechanism is to maximize the utility function. Wu, J S and Huey 3 considered a MANET with n number of nodes connected by wireless links, to find out the best route from the source node to the destination node. Wu and Yu 4 described AODV and proposed a threshold based approach to increase the detection rate of selfish nodes. Buttyan and Hubaux 5 proposed a stimulation approach based on a virtual currency, called nuglets. This is a charge and reward scheme. One of the techniques for providing incentives for nodes to behave in cooperative manner is reputation based scheme 6 . In this mechanism, each node gains reputation through providing services to other nodes. Tit for Tat 7 is another model which has been proposed to solve the problem of selfish nodes in routing and packet forwarding. In another work 8 the authors proposed a game theoretic strategy called ERTFT for promoting cooperation between nodes in MANET. Usha and Radha 9 proposed a cooperative approach to detect misbehaving nodes in MANET using Multi hop acknowledgement scheme. Komathy and Narayanasamy 10 evaluated the concept of trust with the help of a distributed framework using a new idea called evolutionary game theory.
Above papers deals with the problem of selfish nodes and malicious nodes and promotes cooperation. But these papers did not consider the cost factor in their mechanism. Therefore to detect selfish nodes in MANET a new game theoretic model has been proposed in this paper. This scheme uses Least Total Cost Factor (LTCF) which ensures that data packet will be transferred through least cost path only. Using Payoff matrix we can prove that a node will be benefitted if and only if it is cooperative in nature.
Proposed Scheme
Here, a new game theoretic scheme has been proposed for selfish node detection in MANET. This is based on modified AODV routing protocol. Additionally using Least Total Cost Factor (LTCF) data packets will always be sent from source node to destination node through least cost path only. Using payoff matrix we can show that a node will be benefitted if and only if it is cooperative in nature. Otherwise, after a prefix threshold limit is crossed the misbehaving or selfish node will be removed from the network. So, this scheme guarantees low cost data transfer and smallest amount of idle time and promotes cooperation in MANET.
Definition of game
A game has three basic components: a set of players, a set of actions or strategies and utility function. So, a game can be expressed as, G = (P; S; U )
• P represents set of players or nodes.
• S is the strategy space of a node.
• U is the utility function of a node.
Players: players are the decision makers in the game model. There are two or more decision makers in each game known as the players.
Strategy: Strategy refers to the rules of selection of action used by the players. Utility: Each player will have a range of possible outcomes and a clear order of preference based on the payment. The goal of the game is to maximize the utility function of each player.
Game theory can be divided into a cooperative game or a non cooperative game. In this paper the game theoretic model is a non cooperative game model.
Network model and assumptions
Network model and assumptions are as follows:
• A mobile ad hoc network with n nodes connected by wireless links has been considered here.
• It is assumed that in this network all links are bi-directional and symmetric.
• Here, it is assumed that some nodes in the network may be selfish but not malicious.
• For a node, only forwarding a packet consumes resources, but receiving or disposing a packet cost no resources.
• It is assumed that every node has its unique id, Cost Factor (CF) and own routing table.
Modified AODV model
In this paper focus has been given on AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Vector) routing protocol to propose the selfish node detection methods and to transfer packets through least cost path. This scheme modifies the existing AODV routing protocol model. So, first of all this modified AODV routing protocol will be introduced.
In this modified AODV routing protocol, five control messages are used to establish and maintain the transmission paths. These control messages are -Hello message (Hello), Route Request message (RREQ), Route Reply message (RREP), Route Error message (RERR) and Acknowledgement message (ACK). The packet format of message is shown in Fig. 2 . It is assumed that each node has its unique id and its Cost Factor (CF). This cost factor (CF) of a node is based on the distance to neighbor nodes, power available, bandwidth, range and some other factors. If CF of a node is X, it means that for forwarding a packet the source node will have to pay this node the cost X. Each node has its own routing table.
Importance of proposed scheme using payoff matrix
It can be proved that a node in this mobile ad hoc network will be benefitted if and only if it is cooperative in nature. This can be proved using payoff matrix. Otherwise, after a prefix threshold limit is crossed the misbehaving or selfish node will be removed from the network.
A game is defined as G = (P; S; U ).
Here, P = n number of players or nodes of the network. S = Strategy set of a node, i.e. S i is the strategy space of node i or set of strategies available for node i . U = Utility function of a node or payoff of a node. So, U i represents the utility function or payoff of node i . From n number of nodes of the ad hoc network we can isolate any pair of nodes and then study the interaction between them, so, in this way it becomes a two-player game. In a two player game, two nodes send a packet to each other and then decide whether to forward or drop their respective packets. Then this game strategy will be repeated iteratively. We can denote a node i , where i belongs to {Node 1, Node 2}, and −i represents its neighbor nodes.
So, in this two player game, Players: Two nodes namely Node1, Node2. Strategy: Either forward or drop packet of other nodes. Utility or Payoff: We assume the reward or benefit a node receives if its packet is relayed by other node is E g , i.e. Energy gain of a node is E g if its packet is forwarded by other node. Similarly, we assume the packet relaying cost of a node is E l , i.e. if a node relay the packet of other node, then the amount of energy loss of the relaying node is E l . E g is always greater than E l , i.e. E g > E l .
So, when both nodes decide to forward each other's packet then payoff for each node is E g − E l . When, one player forwards other players packet, but second player denies to do so, then payoff of first node will be −E l and payoff of second player will be E g . When no player is interested in forwarding other player's packet then payoff for both of them will be zero, i.e. they are not interested in playing the game. So, the single stage payoff matrix of this two player game is shown in figure Fig. 3 .
So, from the above pay off matrix, we can say that if the game is played only once, then the condition for achieving Nash Equilibrium will be {Drop, Drop}. So, in the single stage game we cannot achieve cooperation. But actually in a mobile ad hoc network, all nodes periodically choose an action, and therefore it becomes an infinitely repeated game for all participating nodes of the game. So, in this infinitely repeated game, each node has to consider its future payoff. If a node behave selfishly then it will be punished by other nodes of the network in future, and therefore the selfish node will be removed from the network. So, in infinitely repeated game, cooperation can be achieved. If each player is cooperative in the network then it will be benefitted for entire game as well as for each player of the game. From the payoff matrix we can see, if both players forward each other's packets, then payoff for each node will be E g -E l , which is the actual best case for the game or the network. So, this game promotes cooperation in the network.
Similarly, on the other side, let us consider two nodes, one normal node and other one is selfish node. Each node is an intermediate node of a path from source node to destination node. Let the cost factor of both nodes is X i and actual relaying cost of the intermediate node is Y i . It means for forwarding a packet each intermediate node will receive X i and its expense for forwarding is Y i . So, for a normal node, since it forwards the packet of other node, it will receive a payoff of X i − Y i . But a selfish node will not receive a payoff if it does not forward other node's packet. So, we can say forwarding a packet is beneficial for each node since X i is greater than Y i . So, the payoff of both intermediate nodes in terms of cost are shown in Fig. 4 .
So, from the above figure it is clear that payoff for a normal node is always X i − Y i , since it always forwards packet of other node. But a selfish node will receive X i − Y i payoff when it forwards packet of other node and it will not receive any payoff when it does not forward. Since X i − Y i > 0, so, we can say that forwarding other node's packet is always beneficial.
So, the utility function of an intermediate node,
, is better when the node forwards packet of other node. Thus, it promotes cooperation in the network.
Types of misbehavior of selfish node
In this modified AODV routing protocol, the possible misbehavior of the selfish node are as follows:
• Not forwarding RREQ messages.
• Not forwarding Data messages.
• Not forwarding ACK messages.
• Not sending Hello messages.
• Delayed forwarding RREQ messages.
• Not forwarding RREP messages.
Among these misbehaviors of selfish nodes, here we will focus on the first three cases, i.e. Not forwarding RREQ message, Not forwarding Data message, and Not forwarding ACK messages, since these types of misbehavior of selfish node is mostly responsible for the degradation of performance of MANET.
Selfish node detection algorithms
• Selfish Node detection algorithm for Not forwarding of RREQ message:
In AODV routing protocol, first of all each node sends Hello message to all of its one hop neighbor nodes. Then each node stores the id's of the nodes from which they received the Hello messages, in its routing table. During creation of a path, source node checks its routing table first. Then if the destination node is not present in its routing table, it starts sending RREQ message to each of its one hop neighbor nodes. Each normal neighbor node will again rebroadcast it to their one hop neighbor nodes and it continues until the destination node is reached. Since the source node is also a one hop neighbor node of each of these nodes so it will receive the same. Each time the RREQ message is delivered with the sender node's id. So, source node can check the character of each of its neighbor nodes. If it has not received the same RREQ from one of its neighbor nodes within a prefixed timeout then that node will be marked as potential misbehaving node. This process continues repeatedly. Each normal intermediate node after receiving RREQ, rebroadcasts this RREQ to all of its one hop neighbor nodes. Consequently the node from which it received RREQ, will also receive the same RREQ from this node and it makes the node to be marked as a normal node. In later stages, if any node denies forwarding this RREQ message, then that node's previous node will not receive the same. Hence, the node that is denying will be marked as potential misbehaving node. For each potential misbehaving node, a threshold value is maintained. If the number of times a node is marked as a potential misbehaving node exceeds this threshold Table 1 . Selfish node detection algorithm for Not forwarding of RREQ. limit, then that node will be flagged as selfish node and this information will be sent to all other nodes of the network. The detail algorithm is given in Table 1 .
• Selfish Node Detection Algorithm for Not forwarding of Data packet:
After some transmission paths are established, they will be ranked according to their Total Cost Factor. The path with least total cost will be ranked as 1 and so on. Then, when the preset time out for path establishment is over, data packet transmission will be started from source node to destination node through the rank 1 path. Data packet along with the data contains the following information,
• Source node's address.
• Destination node's address.
• Transmission path sequence, i.e. the order of nodes in the transmission path from source to destination node. • Current Sender Node, i.e. the node of the transmission path which is holding the data packet currently. • Next Receiver Node, i.e. the node of the transmission path where the data packet has to be sent by the current sender node.
This detection algorithm can be explained with an example. Let, the data transmission path is A-B-C-D-E, where the source node is A and destination node is E. The transmission path sequence is stored in the data packet. Initially Current Sender Node (CSN) is set as A and Next Receiver Node (NRN) is B. When data packet reaches B, then the value of CSN and NRN will be modified. CSN will be set as B and NRN will be set as C. In this way, the value of CSN and NRN will be modified whenever data packet reaches a new intermediate node of the transmission path. Now, suppose B denies to forward the data packet. So, the value stored in NRN i.e. C will not receive the packet. After waiting for a prefixed time out, if the node stored in NRN is unable to receive the data packet, then the node stored in CSN will be marked as potential misbehaving node. So, in this case B will be marked as potential misbehaving node. Otherwise the process continues. If no selfish node is present then finally when D successfully sends data packet to E, then value of CSN becomes E, and value of NRN is also E, since this is the last node of the transmission path. When this happens, i.e. CSN and NRN are same, it indicates successful data transmission from source node to destination node. The detail algorithm is given in Table 2 .
• Selfish Node Detection algorithm for Not forwarding of ACK packet:
During data transmission when data packet reaches the destination node, the destination node replies with an acknowledgement message ACK. This ACK packet is forwarded in the reverse order by the intermediate nodes through the same path via which the data packet is sent to the destination node. Finally, when the ACK packet is sent back to the source node then the source node will be informed that data packet has successfully reached the destination node. But, in this process if ACK packet is lost or dropped due to the presence of selfish node, then it will not reach source node. After waiting for a prefixed timeout, since the source node has not received the ACK packet, so, the source node will again send the same data packet. Thus, destination node will receive same data packet again. This will inform Table 2 . Selfish node detection algorithm for not forwarding data packet. destination node that the ACK packet it sent was not received by the source node. So, this time destination node will again send ACK packet and will check the intermediate nodes to find out the misbehaving node which drops the ACK packet. For this purpose, the ACK packet has two additional fields in it. One field, C AC K , stores the Current Sender Node which is holding the ACK packet and another one is Next Receiver Node N AC K , where the ACK packet has to be sent. Initially C AC K is the destination node. This scheme is similar to the scheme used for detection of selfish nodes not forwarding data packet. When ACK reaches source node, it confirms that data packet has been successfully delivered to the destination node. The detail algorithm is given in Table 3 .
Working principle of proposed scheme
According to the modified AODV routing protocol, initially each individual node of the MANET will broadcast the Hello message (Hello) to all of its neighbor nodes. Each normal node will send this Hello message to all the neighbor nodes which are directly connected to it. After receiving the Hello message, all the neighbor nodes will add the information of the nodes which sent the Hello message to their respective routing table. Each node has its routing table which stores the detailed information of its neighbor nodes, i.e. ids of its neighbor nodes along with their cost factors (CF).
If a source node wants to send data to the destination node, then first of all the source node will check its routing table to search the destination node. If the destination node is not present in the routing table of the source node, then the source node will broadcast a RREQ message to all of its neighbor nodes. Each of its neighbor nodes will also rebroadcast the received RREQ message to their neighbor nodes. This process continues in this way again and again until the destination node is reached. When the destination node receives the RREQ messages sent by its neighbors, the destination node will reply a RREP message to its neighbor node from which RREQ message is received by the destination node. In this process when destination node first responds with RREP message, this RREP message will be sent to its neighbor node from which the destination node received the RREQ message and then the cost factor of that node will be set as the Total Cost Factor (TCF) of the path. Then that node will also send the RREP message reversely to its preceding neighbor node from which it received the RREQ message, according to the records stored in its routing table. This time also when the RREP message reaches that preceding node, its CF will be added to the TCF and new TCF will be set as the sum of the cost factors of the two nodes of the path. Then the node again transmits the RREP message to its preceding node and this process continues in this way. Thus, when the RREP message reaches the source node, the transmission path can be established and this path will be marked as a valid path.
In this way, RREQ messages can be sent to the destination node through various paths and for each path RREP message can be sent back reversely from destination node to the source node. For each path when RREP message is forwarded reversely to the source node, the CF of each node of that path will be added till the source node is reached. Within a preset time out if X numbers of transmission paths are established then those paths will be saved as the valid paths of the network for sending data from source node to destination node. When only first path is created then its TCF will be set as Least Total Cost Factor (LTCF). But when, another path will be created, then its TCF will be compared to the value of LTCF. If the TCF of second path is lower than the value of LTCF, then this path will be stored as Rank 1 path, and its TCF will be saved as LTCF and first path will get Rank 2. Otherwise the first path will remain at Rank 1 and newly created path will get Rank 2. In this way the process continues, i.e. all the transmission paths will be ranked according to their TCF. The path with Least Total Cost Factor (LTCF), will be marked as rank 1, the path with second lowest TCF will be marked as rank 2 and so on.
During data transmission, for any reason, if a node in this transmission path is unable to communicate with its neighbor node in this path, then that node will send a Route Error (RERR) message to the source node and remove all the information belonged to that transmission path from its routing table.
Similarly, during data transmission it can be found that there are selfish nodes present in the network. Selfish nodes of type -'Not forwarding RREQ packet', do not forward RREQ message for other nodes, so transmission paths can not be build through these nodes. Selfish nodes of type -'Not forwarding Data packet', may deny to forward data packets for other nodes during data transmission. So, this type of selfish nodes need to be detected using the previously described algorithms. After some transmission paths are made, if it is found that a node is selfish in nature, then all the valid transmission paths are checked and if the selfish node is found in any valid transmission path then that path will be removed from the database and the remaining transmission paths will be re-ranked according to their TCF. LTCF will be modified if required.
In MANET, each node has the capability to determine its own needs. So, each node can set the maximum price it is willing to pay for packet transferring. This value is only known to source node S and it is denoted as S max− pay . So, whenever a path is being created and its TCF is being calculated, the TCF of that path will be checked at each stage with the value of S max− pay . At any stage if it is found that TCF of the path > S max− pay , then that path will not be formed further and will not be stored.
After the preset time out for path establishment is over, data packet transmission is started from source node towards destination node through the rank 1 path. When data packet will reach the destination node, the destination node will reply with an acknowledgement message ACK in the reverse order through the same path via which the data packet is sent to the destination node. Finally, when the ACK packet reaches the source node, the source node will be informed that data packet has successfully reached the destination node.
If S is the source node, which wants to send its data packets to the destination node T via some intermediate nodes, then, the utility function of the source node S is as follows:
where, U S is the utility function of the source node. S max− pay is the maximum amount the source node S can pay to the intermediate nodes of a transmission path for transferring its data packets to destination node T . C F S D represents the cost factor of each intermediate node present in a transmission path from source node to destination node.
Our main goal of this scheme is to detect selfish nodes effectively and then to send data packets from source node to destination node at lowest cost. So, we have to maximize the value of utility of the source node. For this, transmission path which will maximize the value of utility of the source node to the highest level, will be chosen as the best transmission path from source to destination node. So, among all the valid transmission paths, the path for which we will get U S−max , will be chosen as the Rank 1 transmission path, and data transmission will be started through that path. Here, U S−max denotes the maximum utility of the source node.
The detail algorithm of this proposed scheme is given in Table 4 .
Advantages of proposed scheme
Advantages of this proposed scheme are as follows
• This scheme effectively detects selfish nodes.
• Using LTCF, data packets will be sent from source node to destination node through least cost path only. So, this scheme guarantees lowest cost expenditure for packet transmission. • Due to the presence of selfish nodes in the network, if a path has been broken, then the next best available path will be automatically selected for data transmission. So, this scheme guarantees smallest amount of idle time.
Conclusion
Presence of selfish node in MANET may damage the entire communication system. So, it is required to detect those selfish nodes and promote cooperation in MANET. In this paper we have proposed a scheme that can efficiently detect selfish nodes in MANET and ensures that data packet will be transmitted from source node to destination node via least cost path only. This scheme also guarantees the smallest amount of idle time and greater availability as in case of a broken path, the next best path will be automatically selected for transmission on the basis of the ranking.
